Marketing at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

please read the attached files and answer the below questions separately and number each answer according to the related question.
the second file is a report based on the first file done by a group in our class which we can refer to.

1. What is the “Product” the company is selling, and what is the unique sales proposition the company offers?

2. Is this the right way, to have a sustainable, viable growth / profitable model?

3. What is the “Product” the company is selling, and what is the unique sales proposition the company offers? Do you all agree with the answer

provided by Group C?

Check out another task that our paper writing services have assisted another student on MMK368 BUSINESS MARKETING

4. Place / distribution channels

5.What benefits are they getting from becoming a niche / focus company? (as defined by Group C)

Group C

Marketing at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz

1) What is the competitive strategy chosen by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
(Wachtell, Lipton) to compete, according to Porter´s competitive strategies?

Porter’s  doctrine  establishes  that  there  are  two  basic  types  of  competitive
advantage:  low  cost  or  differentiation.  The  two  basic  types  of  competitive
advantage combined with the scope of activities for which a firm seeks to achieve
them,  lead  to  three  generic  strategies  for  achieving  above  average  performance
in  an  industry:  cost  leadership,  differentiation,  and  focus.  The  focus  strategy has
two variants, cost focus and differentiation focus.

Wachtell,  Lipton  seems  to  adopt  a  Differentiation  Focus’  strategy,  since  it
decided  to  not  take  routine  assignments  and  not  offer  a  full  range  of  legal
services,  but  focus  on  excelling  in  a  few  selected  areas:  corporate  law,  tax,
antritrust,  creditor’s  right  and  litigation  (Focus  –  Narrow  Target).  The
differentiation  is  pursuit  by  unique  operating  principles:  (i)  a  matter–by­matter
policy,  which  avoids  conflict  of  interest,  (ii)  “superstar”  lawyers  with  a  unique
culture  and  high  collaborative  attitude;  (iii)  associate­to­partner  ratio  that  permits
the  direct  engagement  of  the  partners  in  the  cases;  (iv)
twenty­four­hour­seven­day  full  service;  (v)  fees  based  not  on  number  of  hours
but on the value to the client of services provided.
I like this paragraph….

2) Comment on the firm´s positioning, and the USP of Wachtell, Lipton.

The  firm  focuses  on  matters  that  require  the  attention,  extensive  experience,
expertise  and  reputation  of  its  partners  (one  to  one).  Therefore,  the  firm
positioned  itself  in  the  market  as  the  firm  that  the  corporations  turned  when they
are  desperate  circumstances  and  their  usual  legal resources proved inadequate.
It  sells  itself  as  the  unique  firm  that  can  provide  them  innovative,  on  time,  high
Group C

quality  and  effective  legal  solutions  in  specific  areas  for  very  complex  problems.
We will have to build on this a little bit further…

3) What about the 4 Ps, as applied to a law firm like Wachtell, Lipton?
Please, comment on:
a) Product: What is the “product” they are selling and how are they
positioning it?
b) Price: What is their pricing strategy? Is it consistent with the product
positioning?
c) Promotion: How are the partners promoting the company?
d) Place: What are their distribution channels to promote the firm´s
services?

What
Defined
(a)  Product
Specialized  legal  services.  They  are  positioned  as
innovative,  on  time,  high  quality  and  effective  legal
solutions for complex and urgent corporate problems.
(b)  Price
High  value.  It  is  consistent  with  the  product  positioning,
since  they  are  perceived by the clients as creating a high
value  for  them  –  ex.  poison  pill  that  avoids  hostile
takeover (external factor).

(c)  Promotion
There  is  not  promotions  regarding  the  legal  fees, since it
provides  a  high  value  services  in  emergency  scenarios.
However,  the  firm  affirms  that  its  legal  fees  follow  a
different  approach,  since  they  are  based  on  the  value  to
the  client  of the service provided (external factor) and not
on  numbers  of  hours  worked  (internal  factor).  Further,
the  partners  promote  the  company  (advertisement)  by
constructing  a  proven  reputation.  In  this  regard,  they
speak  in  seminars,  teach  at  top  law  schools,  deliver
speeches, write books and law articles.

(d)   Place
Through  channel  partners  –  The  partners  use  the
professional  associations,  top  law  schools,  law  books
and  congresses  to  achieve  the  general counsels, as well
as  use  the  investment  banks  to  access  the  clients  in  the
kind of cases the firm take on.

It  does  not  require  a  retainer  they  are  uniquely
positioned  to  partner  with  firms  they  would  otherwise
compete  with.  The  same  is  true  about  the  limited  range
of  services  they provide and the matter­by­matter basis –
Group C

(e)   Plazo
which  allows  them  to  have  a  distribution  channel  with
limited conflict.

They  deliver  services  that  are  considered  “urgent”  or
priority  to  their  customers.  So,  while  they  have  a  limit
geographical  reach,  tele­commuting  allows  them  to  stay
responsive to their customers quick turn times.

Very nice summary of the 4 Ps, we will discuss them….

4) When Lipton talks about “marketing” inside his company, which of the “Ps” he
is really referring to?

Lipton  refers  to  “Product”  and  “Place”.  He  mentions  the  “last  impression”,
remitting  to  the  high  quality  of  the  services  provided  (product),  which  makes  the
client  remember  the  firm  after  10  years  when  a  serious  problem  arises  –
institutional  memories.  Further,  he  mentions  the  different  ways  to  promote  the
company  in  order  to  construct  a  proved  reputation  beyond  general  consuls,
investment banks and directs of blue chip companies.
What is going on then, with the other two remaining Ps, Promotion and Price?

5) Who is/are the “Client/s” they are really targeting?

The  partners  of  the  firm  are  targeting  the  corporations  in  desperate
circumstances  that  its  usual  legal  resources  proved  inadequate.  In  this  regard,
they  accepted  to  pay  high  legal  fees  to  solve  huge, urgent, specific and complex
problems.
I like this in terms of “market segmentation”.
I  would  like  you  to  build  a  little  bit  more  of  “who  is  the  internal  client”,  or  the
“decision maker INSIDE the client”….

Group C

Addendum – Additional Comments

PRICING

If  pricing  is the “monetary expression” of something value, WLRK have elected to
use  a  “Top  Down”  or  “Value  to  the  customer”  approach  to  their  pricing  strategy.
That  is,  rather  than  simply  apply an hourly charge to their services rendered they
have  chosen  to  base  their  fees  on  the  value  the  customer  will  see.  Here we see
they have chosen to retain between ¼ and 1 percent of the total expected value.

Beyond  this,  WLRK  has  also  chosen  not  to  provide  detailed  invoices  –  instead
focusing  on  the  total  aggregate  value  rather  than  the  line  items  of  time  and
services  rendered.  This  is  not  dissimilar  to  luxury  or  premium  brands  of  physical
product offerings.

PRODUCT
Compared to other firms, WLRK have chosen a relatively
LINE
small cross­section of offerings (six).
MIX
Still, these offerings are distinct from one another in many
ways. That is, there are few parallels between creditor
rights and real estate law. That said, all roads lead to
litigation at some point.

THE BCG MATRIX

While  more  economic  information  is  needed  to  assess  the  performance  of  any
given  line  of  legal  practice,  it  appears  on  the  surface  that  none  of  WLRKs
services  fall  into  the  “dog”  category.  Instead,  by  staying  highly  focused  they
appear  to  have  a  number  of  Stars  in  their  portfolio.  The  question  for  them,
therefore  is  whether  or  not  pushing  into  a  new  practice  area  would  create
incremental  value  to  their  bottom  line  over  simply  expanding  the  services  and
client base they have in their existing offering pool.

PUSH MODEL

Finally,  while  it’s likely they employ a combination of push and pull efforts to drive
new  opportunities,  theirs  is  the  type  of  service  that  isn’t  broadly  needed
(fungible).  Further,  from  the  reading  it  appears  they  spend  greater  energy  on
building their reputation through delivery and channel partners than advertising.
Pull  Model  ­  lawyers  usually  use  a  pull  model.  They  make  marketing  ­  classes,
articles,  books,  seminars  to  create  a  reputation  on  behalf  the  clients  ­  they  will
remember the firm when they really need ­ complex and urgent cases.
Group C

What
Client
Company
Collaboratio
n
Competition
Context
Defined
Inhouse general counsel, investment bankers, and board
members
Law Firm
Brilliant  engaged  lawyers  who  works  as  a  family  without
formalities with a one­one basis
Large firms providing services in all segments
MeA Boom

In  the  marketing  analysis  (Ps)  ?  Strategy  Formulation  ?  Strategy
Implementation (Cs), we see:

? Segmentation  is:  Investment  Banking  and  real  estate  transactions,  MeA,
Restructions, Litigation
? Targeting is: Urgent and “Challenging” legal matters
? Positioning is: Highly specialized legal services (the rangers)

SERVICES MARKETING

? Intangible: As defined, you cannot touch, taste, or smell their services.
? Variability:  The  quality  (as measured by expertise and outcomes) between
firms is extraordinary.
? Inseparability:  While  their  four  names  are  ingrained  in  the  company  –
these  founding  partners  are  likely  rarely  involved  in  most  cases  given  the
sheer number of lawyers and associates (300+)
? Perishability:  Fortunately  for  them,  the  law  does  not  change  particularly
quickly  –  making  their  services  and  referable  work  valuable  over  a  longer
period of time.

“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
When The American Lawyer published the 1995 results of its annual “Am Law 100″ survey,
Martin Lipton was pleased to see that Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz had reclaimed the top spot
in revenue per lawyer and profit per partner. The survey reported that Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz had grossed $990,000 per lawyer—over $200,000 more than the second place firm. 1 A few
days after the survey was released, two case writers from the Harvard Business School
interviewed Lipton about his firm’s marketing practices. Lipton’s initial response to their questions
was that the firm did not do any marketing of its services.
Early History
Herb Wachtell, Martin Lipton, Leonard Rosen, and George Katz had been contemporaries
at New York University School of Law. Ten years after graduation, a variety of circumstances
prompted them to reconvene in order to form a new law firm. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
(Wachtell Lipton) opened its doors in 1965. The founders were determined that their firm be an
old-fashioned partnership rather than a business. They wanted to avoid hierarchy and to promote
a congenial and egalitarian working environment. They also agreed that their firm would not take
routine assignments and would not offer a full range of legal services. Rather, it would focus on
excelling in a few select areas: corporate law, tax, antitrust, creditors’ rights, and litigation.
Wachtell Lipton quickly established an excellent reputation. Lipton remembered:
We had a lucky break right from the start. I had a childhood friend who
left one of the most prominent Wall Street investment banks and founded a small
and very successful boutique investment firm. Soon after we opened our doors, we
successfully handled a law suit for my friend’s firm. As a result, we did a lot more
legal work for this firm, and this firm recommended us to its clients. From the
beginning, we operated on the assumption that selling was not for us and that if you
1″The Am Law 100,” The American Lawyer, July/August 1995, Special Pullout Section.
Research Associate Samantha Kate Graff prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Jay W.
Lorsch as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of an
administrative situation.
Copyright © 1995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to
reproduce materials, call (800) 545-7685 or write the Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163.
No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or
transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—
without the permission of Harvard Business School.
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“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
work hard and do a terrific job, people will come to you. And, of course, there is
always luck.
During its first year and a half of operation, a great portion of Wachtell Lipton’s revenue
came from one corporate client. This key client then asked Wachtell Lipton to do something that
the partners judged unethical. The partners refused and lost the client. At that point, not even sure
their firm could survive, they adopted a distinctive policy: Wachtell Lipton would never again
accept a retainer to do undefined future work; it would function only on a matter-by-matter basis.2
Operating Principles
Wachtell Lipton not only survived but also thrived over the following three decades.
Largely through an iterative process, it developed a set of operating principles that differentiated
it from other corporate law firms:
Case Selection and Innovation
The matter-by-matter policy turned out to be a key competitive advantage. Wachtell
Lipton became known as one of the rare firms to which corporations turned when they were in
desperate circumstances and their usual legal resources proved inadequate. Wachtell Lipton
avoided conflicts of interest arising from ties to long-standing clients, and other law firms could
enlist Wachtell Lipton as co-counsel without fearing that it would attempt to displace their
relationships with their clients.3
Wachtell Lipton attained the founders’ goal of avoiding routine legal chores. The firm
could afford to be highly selective, for even in a slump, clients offered at least twice as many cases
as it could handle. The firm preferred cases that involved new, challenging , and high-profile
issues. According to Lipton:
The firm encourages innovations and has been successful in developing
many, such as cross-border equity mergers, mortgage-pass-through securities, the
poison pill, the state business combination takeover laws, and innovative forms for
merger and acquisition transactions.
The firm prided itself in its willingness to risk litigation in order to sustain the innovations
that it believed would accomplish its clients’ objectives. Winning was what counted.
Staffing and Growth
Wachtell Lipton was committed to deliberate and careful growth, and in 1995, it employed
140 lawyers and about 350 support staff. It was smallest law firm of the “Am Law 100.”4 It had
2William H. Starbuck, “Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Card: One Exceptional Success,”
Working Paper, New York University, 1992, p. 16.
3William H. Starbuck, “Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Card: One Exceptional Success,”
Working Paper, New York University, 1992, p. 18.
4″The Am Law 100,” The American Lawyer, July/August 1995, Special Pullout Section.
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“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
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only one office and would not expand by merger. When need be, it worked closely with firms in
other cities.
The firm limited its recruiting to top candidates from top law schools, and in an effort to
preserve its unique culture, it prohibited lateral hiring. No one was hired or retained unless he or
she was expected to become a partner. Partnership decisions were made after six years—much
earlier than at most other firms—and approximately 50 percent of associates made it to partner
level. One partner remarked, “We have insanely tight criteria on whom we let in. We only take
superstars.” Other partners described the firm’s typical lawyers as “wildly self-motivated,”
“extremely self-confident,” and “brighter than almost everyone.” 5 Lipton furthered, “We are
talking law review, Phi Beta Kappa, clerkships with outstanding judges, and assistant U.S.
Attorneys.” The partners went to great lengths, however, to ensure that the natural competitive
instincts of these “superstars” were turned outward and that a team spirit prevailed inside the
firm.
Although most corporate law firms maintained a much larger ratio of associates to
partners, Wachtell Lipton preserved a one-to-one ratio. The relatively small size of the firm
combined with the unusual associate-to-partner ratio allowed associates to take on substantial
responsibilities right away, to work with partners directly and informally, and to enjoy the
satisfaction of meaningful client contact at an early stage in their development.
A letter distributed to potential applicants stated, “The result of our unique combination of
sophisticated practice, intellectually charged atmosphere, people oriented culture, and level of
client contact is a group of associates who are excited about the firm.” Wachtell Lipton consistently
ranked in the top five firms nationwide for associate satisfaction in The American Lawyer survey of
third and fourth-year associates.
Compensation
The compensation system reflected the egalitarian culture of the firm. It was intended to
prevent internal competition, to thwart the creation of intra-firm fiefdoms, and to ensure that the
firm’s success was shared equitably with all who made it possible. All partners including the
founders were compensated on a lockstep basis. Everyone in the same age group received the same
amount, without regard to hours worked, client contact, or firm administration. Associates and nonlegal staff were paid a base salary that increased

annually in lockstep, and they were also
rewarded a substantial year-end bonus that was tied only to firm performance.
Billing
Contrary to most other law firms, Wachtell Lipton’s fees were based not on number of hours
worked but on the value to the client of services provided. (See Exhibit 1 for Policies with Respect
to Fees.) Fees were designed to be fair and reasonable, considering that the firm offered an
unusually low associate-to-partner ratio and therefore a high degree of direct personal attention
from seasoned experts. A client’s final bill depended not only upon how much time the case took but
also on such factors as the intensity of the firm’s efforts, the magnitude of the issue at hand, the
complexity of the matter, and the result achieved.
5William H. Starbuck, “Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Card: One Exceptional Success,”
Working Paper, New York University , 1992, p. 22.
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“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
Work Ethic
Clients were paying high prices for immediate results of premium quality, so every
situation was treated as a crisis. According to Lipton, “The firm’s operations are geared to the
needs of its practice—twenty-four-hour-seven-day full service; always prepared to do a deal, fight
an injunction, or do whatever on an overnight basis.” A number of associates captured the firm’s
work ethic: “People really care. They’ll work twenty hours to improve a document two percent;”
“Wachtell Lipton has a quality consistency far higher than any other law firm;” “Peoples’ drive to
do a spectacular job is so great that they’ll drive themselves nuts.”6 Lipton described how the
intense work ethic meshed with the nurturing culture that the founding partners tried to sustain:
There is a lot of pressure here and the work is difficult. But the very close
personal relationships among the lawyers means that whenever there is a need,
there are volunteers to help. We treat one another like family. When people are
here late, we feed them. When someone has a medical or personal problem, the
firm does what it can to help take care of it.
Task Force Approach
Wachtell Lipton was loosely organized into six practice groups: litigation, corporate,
creditors’ rights, tax, antitrust, and real estate. Everyone was free to choose his or her specialty,
but the firm approached all matters on an interdisciplinary task force basis. Each case was tackled
by a group of lawyers drawn from a variety of practices. Many lawyers felt that the continual
overlapping of specialties across the task forces helped foster the firm’s collegial atmosphere.
Moreover, Lipton believed that the task force approach was one of the firm’s major competitive
advantages. The types of cases handled by the firm generally required a mix of expertise. Since
the firm was already geared to provide this, it did not have to expend effort forcing its people into
unaccustomed arrangements.
Coordination and Control
Most partners regarded the management structure as informal and disorganized. One
partner exclaimed, “Our overhead costs are twice that of most firms!” Another commented, “This
place would go bananas if we tried to put in systems and turn it into an efficient organization.” 7
Lipton reflected, “The firm is not a business, it is an old fashioned professional partnership. It is
about handshakes among friends. This may be at the cost of structure and efficiency, but from the
client’s standpoint, it means the work is done in the best and fastest way possible.”
Three committees administered the firm. These committees consisted entirely of those
partners who volunteered to serve, and often, no one knew who was on them. One partner claimed:
Up to now, policy decisions have been made by consensus. But 60 partners
makes getting everyone to agree very, very tough. Ten percent can be overcome, but
a 60-40 split leads to slow decisions. Ultimately, some kind of smaller decisionmaking system will have to get put into place. Now, a lot of major

decisions get
6William H. Starbuck, “Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Card: One Exceptional Success,”
Working Paper, New York University , 1992, p. 24.
7William H. Starbuck, “Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Card: One Exceptional Success,”
Working Paper, New York University , 1992, p. 29.
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“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
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made by the three remaining founding partners over lunch. If this system wasn’t
benevolent, it would have been deposed.8
The founding partners were trying to push down the onus of leadership to their younger
counterparts. Lipton claimed, “We badly need to introduce a more defined management structure.
My generation is just too old to adjust to this idea, so we are putting it on the next generation to put
this structure in place.”
The Successful 1980s
Wachtell Lipton sustained strong practices in general litigation, corporate and securities,
bankruptcy and creditors’ rights, and antitrust, but its reputation skyrocketed due to its work during
the 1980s mergers and acquisitions wave. Wachtell Lipton became one of the country’s most
prestigious and profitable law firms by defending companies targeted for takeover. The firm’s
achievements were largely attributed to Martin Lipton’s 1984 invention of the share purchase
rights plan—popularly dubbed the “poison pill.” Adopted by a target company’s board of directors
without a shareholder vote, the poison pill triggered at the threat of a takeover to make it
prohibitively expensive for an unfriendly suitor to purchase more stock. The raider was forced into
a reactive role, compiling legal arguments to destroy the pill and giving the target time to
restructure or to seek a better offer. In 1985, Wachtell Lipton successfully defended a prototype of
the pill on behalf of Household International, Inc. before the Delaware Supreme Court. Hundreds
of companies then adopted pills of their own. A prominent New York lawyer called the poison pill
“the single most important development in corporate law in the past ten years,” and a commissioner
with the Securities and Exchange Commission claimed, “To the extent that there is an Elvis
Presley in the M&A field, it’s Marty Lipton.”9
Through the latter half of the 1980s, Wachtell Lipton played a central hand in such highprofile deals as: Carl Icahn’s unsuccessful bid for Phillips

Petroleum Company; Capital Cities
Communication’s acquisition of ABC; Ronald Perelman’s takeover of Revlon, Inc.; the Bank of New
York Company, Inc.’s takeover of Irving Bank Corporation; Philip Morris Companies Inc.’s
successful bid for Kraft, Inc.; Maxwell Communications Corporation’s takeover of Macmillan, Inc.;
and AB Electrolux’s unsuccessful bid for the Murray Ohio Manufacturing Company. Wachtell
Lipton became the premiere choice for blue-chip managements besieged by hostile bids, and it
repeatedly produced the highest revenue per lawyer and profits per partner of any firm in the “Am
Law 100″—despite the fact that it did not leverage associates in the three-to-one pyramid of most
other prominent New York firms.10
“Marketing” the Firm
As his conversation with the Harvard case writers progressed, Lipton indicated that his
firm actually did carry out some activities aimed at building the firm’s reputation. Whether this
constituted marketing depended on how one defined that term:
8William H. Starbuck, “Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Card: One Exceptional Success,”
Working Paper, New York University , 1992, p. 30.
9Anthony Borden, “Dealmaker of the Decade,” The American Lawyer, March 1989, p. 43.
10Anthony Borden, “Dealmaker of the Decade,” The American Lawyer, March 1989, p. 43.
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“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
There is no such thing as a monopoly of talent, so there is always marketing
involved. What is marketing about for us?
It is largely about exposing our expertise to inside general counsels. It used
to be that a company’s outside lawyer was its key adviser and would handle all
issues that arose. Today, the inside general counsel orchestrates everything. It is
his or her role to shop among any number of law firms for the expertise that apply
to a given situation. So, it is critical that your firm is viewed as having specialties
in a few areas. You can be the best golfer or entertainer, but no inside general counsel
will risk hiring you unless you have a proven reputation. The way you make your
expertise known is to speak at seminars and professional associations, to teach
courses at top law schools, to deliver speeches, and to write books and law review
articles.
Board room credibility is another very important aspect of marketing.
Management always wants a lawyer who is highly regarded and who makes
directors feel comfortable and confident. The more board rooms you appear in, the
more directors you meet, and after awhile, you know most directors of major
companies.
Marketing for us is also about making sure we have a solid reputation with
investment banks. We have extensive relationships with investment banks. They
often serve as the intermediary between law firms and clients in the kind of cases
we take on. We have to make sure we get the deal done and done expeditiously. An
investment bank can mean disaster if it doesn’t think you have the ability or
credibility. It will go a long way to convince its clients.
Finally, marketing is about the crop of geniuses we hire every year—not
only because their extraordinary talents contribute to the quality of our output, but
also because our young lawyers have an important role to play in building and
maintaining relationships. As the founding generation gets older, the general
counsels and bankers we are working with get younger, and we can get in their way.
If an old guy with gray hair walks into a board room with a 40 year old general
counsel or a 30 year old banker, who is the board going to pay attention to?
In the long run, marketing is about succeeding so well that we make a
lasting impression. We have companies that we haven’t heard from in 10 years
call us up and say, “We are in trouble, and you are our lawyers for this kind of
issue.” We want to be a part of our clients’ institutional memories. We want them
to remember to turn to us when a serious problem arises.
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“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
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Exhibit 1 Policies with Respect to Fees
Policies with Respect to Fees in Acquisition and Corporate Control Matters
1. The firm provides a unique service in acquisition and corporate control matters. In order
to provide the special attention and expertise required, the firm limits the number and type of
these matters undertaken and the firm operates with a ratio of partners to associates of one to one.
Accordingly, we must set our fee for an acquisition or corporate control matter not just on time, but
also on the intensity of the firm’s efforts, responsibility assumed, complexity of the transaction,
and result achieved.
2. While our fees are not based on the amount involved in a matter, experience indicates
that such fees in acquisition matters commonly range between 1/4 of 1% and 1% of the amount
involved. In acquisition and corporate control transactions in which the firm is to play a major role,
there is a minimum fee of $250,000.
3. Overall, we seek to obtain outstanding results for our clients for a fee that our clients will
feel fairly values our services.
4. The firm does not establish yearly retainer relationships.
5. Statements for fees are rendered periodically or at the conclusion of a matter. Interim
statements for fees do not represent the final fee; they are on account of the final fee. The firm does
not furnish long-form descriptions of service or details as to particular lawyers and hours.
Policies with Respect to Fees in Litigation Matters
1. The firm’s manner of handling litigation matters differs from that of most firms. The
litigation group operates with a ratio of partners to associates of approximately one to one.
Litigation matters are thus at all times afforded the direct, personal attention of partners having
expertise and sophistication with respect to the issues, and staffing generally is kept to the
absolute minimum necessary to provide the highest quality representation. The firm seeks and
often achieves early and efficient resolution of matters without prolonged litigation. The firm’s
experience has been that its approach to litigation results in substantially less attorney hours being
expended than is the case with other firms involved in the same or like litigation matters.
2. The firm’s fees in litigation matters are designed to be fair and reasonable. Factors
included in determining fees are not just time charges but the intensity of the firm’s efforts, the
magnitude of the matter at issue, the complexity of the matter, and the result achieved. Based
upon application of such factors, the fee may exceed aggregate hourly time charges. In most cases,
the fee will be less than the aggregate of hourly time charges had the matter been handled in the
more typical law firm manner.
3. Statements for fees in litigation matters are rendered periodically. Interim statements
for fees do not represent the final fee; they are on account of the final fee. The firm generally does
not furnish long-form descriptions of services. As a matter of normal practice, however, we
endeavor to keep our clients advised on a current basis of what is occurring in litigation matters and
what we are doing. If further information is desired, the attorney working on the matter is always
willing to provide such information informally.
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This document is authorized for use only in EXLLM_EN_Oct14_S1_Marketing for Lawyers by Prof. Fernando Corti?as at IE Business School from July 2014

to January 2016.
496-037
“Marketing” at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
4. We recognize that litigation and litigation expenses have been increasing rapidly and
that clients are very concerned about the costs of litigation. We believe that our approach to
litigation permits matters to be handled on the most economical basis. Overall, we seek to obtain
outstanding results for our clients for a fee that our clients will feel fairly values our services.
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This document is authorized for use only in EXLLM_EN_Oct14_S1_Marketing for Lawyers by Prof. Fernando Corti?as at IE Business School from July 2014

to January 2016.

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